INTRODUCTION
Mexico's modernization under the rule of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911) generated a relationship between organized labor in the United States and Mexico. The interaction between Mexican workers, their organizations, and the US labor movement resulted from shared levels of industrial development among regional economies that straddled the international border. Beginning in the 1880s major US investments in railroads, mining, petroleum and agriculture linked the future of the northern Mexican economy with the accelerated economic development of the western United States. Uniting the two economies initiated a cross-border flow of Mexican migrants, laborers who joined American workers and protested the abusive practices and arbitrary methods used by turn of the century North American capitalist management. This protest acted as a catalyst for forging the cross-class unity that eventually produced the 1910 Mexican Revolution. In the process, Mexican workers, particularly those who toiled in mining and petroleum, fell under the influence of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) or "Wobblies" as they were called.
While working and living in the United States, Mexicans did not distance themselves from the momentous social change occurring in Mexico. They continued to interact with Mexico through their own periodic returns to the homeland, participation in community life and associations inside the numerous exiled Mexican political movements in Wobblies and Mexican Workers in Mining, 1905-1924 53 exchanged ideas, established principles and designed strategy and tactics. Like the IWW, the Casa emphasized workers' control over production and the use of the strike around immediate demands to better the lot of the working class. Based in Mexico City, during the revolution the Casa's direct participation in the armed struggle led to the expansion of its influence in peripheral industrial areas of the nation where it came into contact with the IWW. The Casa press regularly featured articles from IWW newspapers in the United States and "praised the principles of the organization".
3 When the Casa declined as an organization, the IWW cooperated with anarchosyndicalists and other radical groups that later formed the Confederacidn General de Trabajadores (CGT).
While a shared ideological tradition with Mexican working-class organizations played a significant role in the IWW's penetration of Mexico, its participation in Mexican workers' struggles on both sides of the border was more important. In 1903 Mexican miners in Arizona joined organizers from the Western Federation Miners (WFM) and protested poor pay, working conditions, and discrimination. 4 In 1905 the WFM made up the core of the IWW's membership at its founding convention. In 1906 PLM organizers joined the WFM in leading Mexican miners on strike against the Rockefeller-controlled Greene Copper Company in Cananea, Sonora, inside Mexico. The Cananea incident is considered by most historians as the first battle of the revolution, and the events that transpired there facilitated the efforts of the IWW in organizing Mexican workers. 5 From 1911 to 1924 the IWW carried out propaganda work among Mexicans with Spanish language newspapers printed in the United States, spreading the union's ideas to the mining communities of the Mexican north, and Tampico, the world's leading petroleum producing center. Beginning in 1916, the IWW, cooperating with the Casa del Obrero Mundial t enlisted the support of oil workers, stevedores, and construction workers in Tampico. The Wobblies also agitated among miners and smelter workers in Torre6n, the states of Sonora, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. As early as 1912, the Wobblies had organized four locals in G6mez Palacio, and in Torretfn, where they had established a strong union at 
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Norman Caulfield the metal smelter of the Compama Metalurgica de Torre6n.
6 By 1917, the IWW had solidified its support among Mexican miners working in the south-western United States, and through the early 1920s it continued to thrive in Mexican mining districts, especially in Chihuahua.
As in the US, the IWW rejected the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) concept of collective bargaining, or what one historian has called the "institutionalization of state control" over the labor movement. 7 Instead, like other Mexican labor organizations in the anarchosyndicalist tradition, the IWW defended union autonomy. 8 The Wobblies especially rejected the policies of the Confederacidn Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), an organization that emulated the goals and philosophy of the AFL and encouraged government-labor cooperation. In mining and petroleum, the Wobblies exercised an important role by building on the work of groups like the Unidn Minera Mexicana, and the numerous mutualist and worker education groups that emerged with the development of the Tampico oil region. 10 The mutualist organizations established funds for medical care, burials, and pay for . workers hurt on the job. The membership of the mutualistas as they were called, consisted of artisans, and in some cases included middle-class professionals and merchants. Education and specifically "night-school" instruction was a major function of the mutualistas. Through the mutualistas t workers studied literature, politics, economics and foreign languages, all free of charge. The ultimate goal of mutualistas like Regeneracidn and el Gremio MarUimo Fluvial from the Tampico industrial suburb of Dona Cecilia, hoped to find "Igualidad por la Instruccidn" (equality through instruction)." The mutualist tradition, through its stress on education and worker identity, provided the framework for Casa organizing. By 1912 the existing mutualistas had transformed themselves from Primarily educational groups to organizations of action. Instrumental in this process were the gremios of dockworkers and stevedores. Leading the dockworkers was Samuel Kelly, an ex-sailor and fish vendor. Kelly advocated organization that would defend the "general interests" of port and maritime workers.
12 Kelly and the gremios agitated on two fronts. Hoping to achieve some leverage against the foreign companies, the gremios participated in the maderista movement. Ultimately, however, to better the economic situation of port and maritime workers, Kelly a nd the Gremio Unido de Alijadores attacked the hated contract system that involved "middle men", and instead promoted the direct bargaining for employment between the workers and the ship captains. 13 The result j* Ibid., p. 167. 
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On the same day the strike spread to the Standard Oil and Texas companies, and the leadership demanded more salary increases. 27 The IWW asked for a 50 per cent increase in wages and payment of salaries in Mexican gold, or United States money at the rate of exchange fixed by the government. As more workers became strikers, pickets armed themselves with clubs and physically prevented management and supervisory personnel from entering company facilities. The strikers were further emboldened when the American steamship Mexicana remained in Tampico's harbor because the ship's crew members refused to cross their picket line. 28 In June the strike spread to the Huasteca Petroleum 
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59 » Company, and labor leaders began to threaten a general strike if their demands for salary payment in gold or US currency were not met.
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On 16 July, maritime workers, boatmen, and dockworkers joined the strike when employers rejected the IWW's demands for higher pay. The strikers immediately paralyzed operations by shutting down three American-owned dredging vessels. Six days later a general strike of the Tampico area commenced when over 15,000 workers stopped all petroleum production. The Vice-President of Pierce Oil Corporation, Eben Richards, asked the United States government to protect company property and American lives. Meanwhile, workers in all Tampico refineries had walked off their jobs in sympathy with the maritime employees striking on the Pafluco River. The US State Department assured Richards that steps already had been taken by Mexican officials to control the situation.
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The general strike in the petroleum and shipping industries soon affected the entire Tampico community as street car workers suspended service, and ice-factories and electric light plants closed. Public speeches became more frequent in the city's central plaza. There Casa and IWW leaders attacked the Mexican government and the foreign companies. An atmosphere of intense debate and politicization filled the community's restaurants, saloons, and hotels.
As the crisis deepened, the foreign-owned companies and the American Consul blamed foreign agitators for precipitating the strike. They specifically identified the IWW, and claimed that its leaders intimidated "good" Mexican workers by threatening them with violence if they did not join the strike. 31 Mexican Petroleum Company manager George Paddleford attempted to divide the strikers. He said that he would meet and negotiate with a committee of "regular workers" and not representatives of the IWW, whom he called "outside agitators". Paddleford also refused to negotiate with any team of workers until they complied with state Governor Alfredo Ricaut's proclamation that ordered them back on the job. Strikers ignored Ricaut and Paddleford and the shut down continued.
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Responding to American company pressures and reacting to the strikers' refusal to quit, authorities ordered 300 troops to Tampico from the provincial capital, Ciudad Victoria. The troops arrived in Tampico on 24 July, and company officials along with the state Governor arranged a meeting for the following day. Upon arrival, an American Naval officer, Captain David Richardson, met with the region's new military commander, General Francisco Guerre, and the two discussed the IWW. Richardson informed Guerre that the IWW did not respect his or the Governor's authority and described it as an organization bent on the destruction of private property. He added further that "good" labor unions in the United States opposed the IWW and its tactics. Richardson, when referring to the "good" labor unions in the United States did not specifically mention the AFL, but it can be assumed that this is what he meant since the AFL had acquiesced to the American government's persecution of the IWW during World War I. He also urged Guerre that he should relate this information to the state Governor at their meeting the next morning.
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When the Governor, General Guerre, and oil company representatives arrived for the meeting the next day, they discovered that several IWW leaders were already in the office and that a crowd of angry strikers had surrounded the building. The company representatives repeated that they would not meet with IWW members, but only with a committee of what they called "regular" workers. They were also emphatic about their refusal to accept conditions outlined in a 12 July 1917 letter sent to them by IWW leaders, Francisco Gamallo and Ram6n Parreno.
The letter called for immediate raises and union recognition. Company officials also insisted that they would not meet with any committee until all strikers had returned to work. After company officials left, Governor Ricaut attempted to defuse the situation. He promised to hold another meeting with strike representatives the next morning.
34 But shortly after the meeting broke up and the crowd outside dispersed, Ricaut ordered Commander Guerre and his troops to surround IWW headquarters and arrest Wobbly leaders. Soldiers apprehended seventeen IWW members in all, leaving the strike's leadership decimated. By the end of the month, all strikers had returned to their jobs. The oil companies expressed their appreciation to the United States Department of State and praised Governor Ricaut's "handling" of the volatile situation. 48 The Wobblies built upon the organizational efforts of the PLM in the border areas. Through Regeneracidn, the PLM's newspaper, Mexican workers had learned of the magonista opposition to the company store and wage disparity between Mexicans and North Americans.
The ideas that appeared in Regeneracidn reflected the growing radicalism of the PLM's magonista faction. By the time of their self-imposed exile in the United States, Ricardo Flores Mag6n, Praxedis Guerrero and others had abandoned nationalistic liberalism and openly advocated anarchism. Contact with American radicals like Emma Goldman and Wobbly Ralph Chaplin reinforced their anarchist convictions and resulted in a commitment to organize Mexican workers, especially along the border. Magonista propaganda made headway among Mexican miners working the vast mineral regions that stretched across the American west into northern Mexico. PLM clubs were especially visible in the mining communities of Sonora and Arizona, like those started by L&zaro Gutierrez de Lara in Cananea, Sonora, and Praxedis Guerrero's Obreros Libres in Morenci, Arizona. In 1906 miners following the leadership of the PLM and the WFM struck the Cananea complex and called for wage equity with foreigners. By 1915, the PLM's focus on economic discrimination had helped to mobilize a Mexican workforce for "direct action" against large mining enterprises and the government of the United States. With the Flores Mag6n brothers on trial in 1916 for violation of US neutrality laws, Mexican workers in the US looked increasingly to the IWW. The IWW's influence grew in the mining regions of the American south-west because they confronted falling wages, poor living and working conditions, and a management system that practiced discrimination against them in the workplace. In early January 1917,1,000 Mexican, Indian and Anglo workers struck mining operations in Ajo, Arizona. They demanded higher wages and refused to accept an agreement negotiated by the AFL's International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (IUMMSW). The workers rejected the agreement with the mining companies because it provided a sliding scale between $1.50 to $2.50 per day for miners working underground and on the surface. They considered the wage increases paltry and discriminatory. Local authorities received the cooperation of the IUMMSW's leadership when they arrested twenty-six miners, whom the union leadership and local press called "outside agitators".
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Despite the repression, Mexican miners continued to organize for higher wages and better conditions. They also bolted the IUMMSW because of that union's refusal to back their demands. Mexican miners at Clifton-Morenci, Arizona, began leaving the IUMMSW's predecessor, the WFM, as early as 1916, after it failed to back a walkout. The increasingly cautious position of the WFM, which led to the creation of the IUMMSW, was largely due to the policies of the union's president, Charles H. Moyer.
Moyer had been an IWW leader and one of the founders of the WFM, but had adopted a more cautious strategy toward organizing workers after authorities released him and IWW leader "Big" 
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From 15 to 17 June 1917, Industrial Union #800 held its first state-wide convention in Bisbee, Arizona, and discussed strategy to confront the copper companies. The 500 members in attendance called for: the abolition of the physical examination; two men to work on each machine; two men to work on raises; discontinuation of all blasting during a shift; abolition of all bonus and construction work; replacement of the sliding scale of wages with a flat daily rate of $6.00 for all men working underground; and no discrimination against members of any organization.
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The demands reflected a desire among miners to exercise control of their work environment and their communities. As in Tampico, where the foreign-owned petroleum companies exercised power over the entire community, the Phelps-Dodge Corporation dominated the Arizona copper range. Besides owning the state's largest mining operation, the Copper Queen, Phelps-Dodge also owned the largest hotel, the hospital, department store, library, newspaper, and a host of other smaller enterprises. 
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The Mexican miners' fight against the arbitrary power of Phelps-Dodge in the workplace evolved into a struggle that encompassed the entire communities where they lived and worked. Mexican miners had worked the Arizona range for years and were quick to demand their perception of "rights". The demands for decent wages and better working conditions were accompanied by calls for affordable housing and food. The occupational hazards that the miners suffered created a unique sense of unity not found among other groups of industrial workers. The tightness and isolation of the mining communities and the dangerous working conditions miners encountered produced a strong propensity to strike.
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Wobbly unions also spread to other locations on the Arizona mining range. In Jerome, Arizona, Mexican miners established a Metal and Mine Workers' Local after the IUMMSW failed to back their demands for higher wages and better conditions. When the United States entered the European war, the IUMMSW fell completely out of favor with the miners after its parent affiliate, the AFL, pledged not to strike for the remainder of the conflict.
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On 5 July 1917, the IWW called a strike and demanded six dollars for a six-hour day. While the IUMMSW called the demands "absurd", "unpatriotic", "disloyal", and "disruptive" to the war effort, both Mexican and Anglo miners supported them and stopped working. Since 1914, the beginning of the European war, orders for strategic minerals had been pouring in from the Allies, particularly Britain. To fill them, mining management ordered around-the-clock production, increasing miners' hours, but at the same time holding wages at pre-war levels, and allowing working conditions to deteriorate. As the owners' profits soared, miners were in no mood to compromise their right to strike and follow the dictates of the IUMMSW. 
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On the heels of the Jerome deportation, the IWW leadership made frequent speeches that called on workers to resist the "authoritarianism" of the companies and the officials of local, state and national government. On 6 July 1917, Jose* Rodriguez spoke before a crowd of over 300 and said that American corporations and the United States government had made Mexican workers "slaves". He urged them to join the IWW and claimed that it was the only organization prepared to unite workers the world over, regardless of their national origin. Rodriguez boasted that the US government did not have enough bayonets to suppress or stop the IWW. Speaking to the same audience, Julio Blanco called the American flag the "banner of oppression" and proclaimed that the red g , the "banner of the workers of the world", belonged to them. In the same speech he also pledged that the companies would not get one pound of copper for the war effort, and that Mexican miners should close friend of Negreira, began distributing El Hombre Libre, an anarchist paper printed in Spain and distributed in Mexico. 67 But the Mexican miners in Arizona never recovered from the repression, which reached its apex on 6 October 1918, when the United States Congress passed the Alien Act.
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In effect, the Alien Act sanctioned the Bisbee and Jerome deportations, the arrests of Martinez and others, and the subsequent expulsions of hundreds of foreigners suspected of subversive activity. The passage of the Alien Act and its strict enforcement meant that Mexican miners had to accept wartime production conditions or face deportation. In addition, the Federal government sanctioned IUMMSW contracts with the copper companies that pledged not to interfere with the war effort by stopping production. The agreements also contained a provision that stated "no employment should be made available for IWW members or for other persons who had been guilty of disloyal utterance against the United States".
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The IUMMSW praised the agreement and threatened to cancel the charter of any local that did not accept it. 70 After the strikers returned to work and industrial peace prevailed in the mining camps, the companies stretched the agreement and refused to recall anyone "whose employment for any reason is contrary to the best interests of the operations". Unidn Minera Mexicana at the founding convention of the CROM in 1918, they were the first to abandon its ranks in 1923, when it created the Partido Laborista and supported Alvaro Obreg6n for the presidency. 77 Despite its efforts, the Unidn Minera Mexicana remained a loose confederation composed of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers in copper, zinc, lead and coal mining. It failed to unite these workers into an industry-wide union that coordinated simultaneous strike activity around a set of universal demands.
By its insistence upon independent industry-wide unionism, the IWW filled an organizational void and made itself attractive to Mexican miners. The Wobblies' history of struggle for Mexican miners' "rights" in the United States also facilitated its organizational efforts inside Mexico. Two decades of Mexican miners crisscrossing the border had led to the proliferation of Wobbly propaganda inside Mexico. For Mexican miners, the IWW's strategy and tactics had already been tested at Cananea and across the border in the United States. The Wobblies' message resembled that of the PLM's, the Casa's and other working-class organizations rooted in the Mexican anarchosyndicalist tradition. Beginning in the 1920s, when mining companies tried to enforce a "new" work discipline, the IWW attempted to direct Mexican miners' resistance.
Miners began a series of strikes at the Rockefeller-controlled Cananea Consolidated Copper Company on 5 October 1920. IWW organizer Antonio C. Ramirez led them on strike in protest of the company's noncompliance with a labor law passed by the state of Sonora in 1916. Although management accepted the law that placed the maximum length of a shift in a mine for seven hours, it refused to pay the miners for eight hours work. Workers also demanded the dismissal of abusive American foremen. The walkout lasted nearly three weeks and turned violent when strikers shot an American foreman. Afterwards, the acting Governor of Sonora, A.M. Sdnchez, sent in 250 troops. Finally, the government intervened and used arbitration to settle the dispute. 78 The actions of IWW organizers at Cananea harkened back to 1906 when the WFM and the PLM led miners on strike over some of the same issues: poor conditions and discriminatory practices by foreign managers. Like Cananea in 1906, the government used force to subdue the strikers. This time, however, the miners, through the Unidn Minera Mexicana, already had fought for and won laws that protected workers on the job. The miners at Cananea followed IWW organizers because "direct action" obliged the government to enforce those laws.
Although it settled the dispute at Cananea, the government refused to stop a seven-week-long lockout by Guggenheim management in the Santa Using Solidaridad, IWW organizers escalated their efforts to organize Chihuahua's miners. The newspaper and literature focused on issues that had plagued Mexican miners for years: long hours, low wages, and abusive foremen who tried to implement company productivity schemes. Besides earning meager wages, which averaged around one dollar per day, miners and smelter workers had to buy their necessities at company stores at inflated prices. To protest the conditions and the firing of two of its members, IWW Local #210 called for a strike at the El Potosi Mining Company in Santa Eulalia. Employees at Santa Eulalia responded, and the strike quickly spread to Avalos and eventually involved 5,000 miners and smelter workers. The strikers then demanded an end to all piece-work, a minimum wage of $2.50 per day and the dismissal of two foremen.
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The IWW held public meetings throughout the mining districts of Chihuahua that eventually numbered as high as 3,000. Company officials pleaded with local authorities to break up the meetings and force the strikers back to work. Local authorities finally acted on 11 May, when a contingent of thirty mounted rural guards charged a gathering of strikers at Santa Eulalia. During the scuffle police injured about a dozen people and apprehended seven strikers. The following day the IWW organized a march of over 300 people to Chihuahua City and demanded the freedom of the three arrested strike leaders. The next day Governor Reynaldo Talavera released Francisco Morales, Enrique Castillo, and Francisco Nunez, all of whom had been principal strike leaders.
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The strikers then received help from the IWW's international office in Chicago. The North American IWW conducted a fund-raising campaign to help sustain them. Unions in Tampico also sent help to Chihuahua. Just when it appeared that the strikers had captured the initiative, local 
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Norman Caulfield officials and company management wielded the instruments of co-optation and repression. On 27 May, a group of "free" workers signed an agreement with ASARCO and the El Potosi Mining Company. It contained a number of concessions, including the minimum wage, and Sundays off. Piece-work provisions, however, remained. Mining management fired known IWW members and required all workers to sign contracts that prevented them from joining the IWW. Most of the workers returned to their jobs, but a sizable minority remained on strike. In mining, like the petroleum industry, the IWW's contribution to the establishment of permanent labor organization was significant. Although Mexican miners had organized themselves into mutualistas initially and then gremial organizations under the umbrella of the Unidn Minera Mexicana during the revolutionary period, an industry-wide confederation did not emerge until 1934. 87 The Wobblies' activities represented an important period of organizational transition for Mexican miners. Like other anarchosyndicalist organizations in Mexico, the IWW agitated not only for the long-range goal of workers' control, but also raised immediate demands such as higher wages, better conditions, and union recognition. The Wobblies' presence reinforced the struggle by other Mexican miners' unions that eventually led to successful industry-wide organization. In mining, more so than petroleum, the IWW demonstrated its role in the organizational development of the working class on an international level.
CONCLUSION
Like other radical unions that attempted to organize Mexican workers during the revolutionary period, the IWW ultimately failed to forge an enduring organization. But its contribution to the development of the Mexican working-class movement and its future organization was significant. As Mexico opened its door to foreign investors, particularly from the United States, their economies and subsequently their labor Wobblies and Mexican Workers in Mining, 1905-1924 75 movements became more integrated. This was especially true in mining as the vast mineral region of the American west linked up with northern Mexico. The integration spurred a cross-border flow of Mexican workers who came into contact with radical labor unions like the WFM, and later the IWW.
When Mexicans returned home, they carried with them the tactics and strategies of American syndicalism and combined them with those of already existing radical labor groups inside Mexico. In 1906 the IWW established firm credibility among Mexican workers when it participated in the great Cananea uprising. Once inside Mexico the Wobblies cooperated with radical PLM members and the Casa del Obrero Mundial. By 1917 it had established locals among miners and smelter workers in the industrial centers of the Mexican north. These factors produced a potentially powerful industrial working class and facilitated the growth of the Wobblies inside Mexico.
During the late 1910s and early 1920s, the Wobblies continued to organize locals among miners and smelter workers. The IWW also played a crucial role in the establishment of the first oil workers' unions in Mexico. As a result the Wobblies became central to the tension that developed between foreign-owned petroleum companies and the Mexican government. The IWW enjoyed success not only because it advocated better wages and conditions, but also union autonomy, a concept rooted in the Mexican labor movement's anarchosyndicalist traditions. Along with other radical labor groups, the Wobblies defended the right to strike and fought for union independence against a government that attempted to harness the militancy of organized labor through the creation of state-backed labor organizations.
Because the Wobblies' presence was so prevalent in strategic profit making industries like mining and petroleum, its significance as a key player in the Mexican labor movement and the revolution cannot be overlooked. The study of the IWW and its impact on Mexican workers also provokes discussion on the larger issues surrounding the 1910 Revolution. The IWW's activities among Mexican workers on both sides of the border helps to better explain the shifting diplomatic, economic and political interests of foreign and Mexican elites and the militant role that organized labor played in the process and outcome of this century's first major social revolution.
Finally, the IWW in Mexico demonstrates clearly its efforts to organize workers on an international level. The Wobblies received support worldwide because they attempted to address the immediate needs of workers caught in an organizational transition between craft and industrial unionism. As world capitalism more thoroughly penetrated peripheral areas like Mexico, the IWW joined other organizations in leading workers to call for a decent living wage, better conditions and organizational recognition. For that reason alone, the IWW played an important role in a crucial transitional phase of international working-class history.
